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Tuck, Rousseau and the Sovereignty of the People 
 
This is a post-print version of the article and is not for citation. The published version is available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01916599.2016.1165925 
 
Richard Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016. 295 pp. $27.99 (paperback). ISBN: 9781107570580. 
 
The Sleeping Sovereign begins with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s claim, from the eighth of his Letters 
from the Mountain, that by not having ‘sufficiently distinguished the Sovereign from the Government’ 
all previous writers have failed to understand the democratic constitution (1). Attending to this 
distinction is crucial, Richard Tuck thinks, if we are to make sense of modern democracy as a 
constitutional system based on the sovereignty of the people. Rousseau, however, overstated his 
originality. The first formulation of the distinction is instead found in Jean Bodin, which gave rise to 
much debate thereafter. On one side of the debate stand, most notably, Hugo Grotius, Samuel 
Pufendorf and Emmanuel Sieyès, and on the other Thomas Hobbes, Rousseau, the Girondins and 
some post-revolutionary American jurists.1  
While the government-sovereignty distinction originates with Bodin, Tuck takes his title from 
Hobbes’s intriguing discussion of time-limited monarchies in chapter seven of De Cive. Following 
Bodin, Hobbes distinguished between the right and exercise of sovereign power (94), and a sleeping 
sovereign could retain the right of sovereignty while playing no role at all in deciding how it should 
be exercised. The implications of this are far-reaching and Tuck credits Hobbes with having 
‘ruthlessly followed through the logic of the distinction and concluded that elective monarchies were 
indeed not sovereign: all the elective monarchies of Europe were (by implication) really either 
                                                          
1  For a chapter-length overview of the main thesis of the book see Richard Tuck, ‘Democratic sovereignty and 
democratic government: the sleeping sovereign’, in Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspectives, edited by 
Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, 2016), 115–41. 
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aristocracies or democracies.’ (91) Tuck reads Rousseau as siding with Hobbes against Grotius and 
Pufendorf—more on this to come—but it is the Girondins who were responsible for developing 
Rousseau’s ideas on popular sovereignty into the modern plebiscitary system. Their model of national 
plebiscites, Tuck claims, is now permanently established in most European countries (161).  
As the book progresses, however, it becomes clear that Tuck’s main interest is America, not 
Europe, and the high point of his history is the period from 1778 to the Civil War, when nearly all 
American states adopted a plebiscitary basis for their constitutions (197). Yet the American 
plebiscitary system never prevailed at the level of the federal constitution. Article V of the 
Constitution proved a major setback by allowing future constitutional amendments to become valid 
without passing through either a state or national convention (211–12), and from the 1830s onwards 
the turn against plebiscites took place at the state level as well. That Tuck laments the demise of the 
popular sovereignty tradition is evident throughout. For the most part this is conveyed, very 
effectively, by presenting the ideas of its proponents (and critics) in a clear and sympathetic light, 
allowing their arguments to speak for themselves. In a concluding chapter, however, he explicitly 
defends majoritarian democratic sovereignty against some common objections, before suggesting that 
taking it seriously would involve adopting the ‘living constitutionalism’ approach to the American 
constitution (282–83). Whatever one thinks of Tuck’s view of modern democracy, it is very 
refreshing to see a detailed analysis of the normative implications of what is principally a historical 
study. 
What Tuck offers us, then, for the first time, is a history of modern democracy that places the 
sovereignty-government distinction centre-stage. This directly challenges an alternative view of the 
legitimacy of modern democracies as based on a certain theory of political representation, perhaps 
best articulated by Sieyès. Rousseau, Benjamin Constant and Sieyès all viewed representation as the 
great modern invention (54), but Tuck instead argues that it is democratic sovereignty (divorced from 
democratic government) that is the distinctively modern phenomenon. Tuck’s narrative is highly 
original and provocative throughout. Given the breadth, it is also admirably concise, retains the 
fluency of the 2012 Seeley Lectures on which it is based, while also presenting us with a lucid 
overview of the main ideas from both the familiar and unfamiliar figures we encounter along the way. 
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If this was not accomplishment enough, Tuck also challenges received wisdom on a number of key 
interpretative points as his story unfolds. It is the sort of book that opens up new debates and invites 
disagreement, and, in this spirit, I proceed to offer some critical observations by focusing on the place 
Rousseau occupies in Tuck’s account. 
 
* 
 
Tuck looks both backwards and forwards from Rousseau, so this provides a helpful point of entry 
from which to evaluate his wider arguments. Looking backwards first, Tuck’s most striking claim is 
that Rousseau’s theory of sovereignty is largely Hobbesian in inspiration.2 Tuck is, of course, alert to 
both the similarities and differences between Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s theories, and whether or not 
one reads Rousseau as a Hobbesian will largely turn on which are deemed most important. 3 
Nonetheless, there are some points of disagreement that I think Tuck understates, which challenge his 
broader narrative. First, Tuck rightly points out that for Rousseau the will of the sovereign pertains to 
‘law, and only law’ (131). The crucial point here is left implicit: Rousseau drew the sovereignty-
government distinction in a different place from Hobbes (following Bodin). Hobbes’s distinction is 
between imperium and administratio (90–91), for which the sovereign need not do anything aside 
from occasionally deciding who should govern the state. Rousseau saw things very differently and 
instead mapped the distinction onto the (Lockean) terminology of legislative and executive power 
(132).4 While Tuck distances himself from traditions in the history of political thought that place 
                                                          
2  More generally for his Hobbesian reading of Rousseau see Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: 
Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford and New York, 1999), 197–207. 
3   For discussions that take the differences to be more important see Joshua Cohen, Rousseau: A Free 
Community of Equals (Oxford, 2010), 62–68; Robin Douglass, Rousseau and Hobbes: Nature, Free Will, and 
the Passions (Oxford, 2015), especially 121–26. 
4  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right, in The Collected Writings of 
Rousseau (hereafter CW), series edited by Christopher Kelly and Roger D. Masters, in 13 vols. (Hanover, NH, 
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Locke and Rousseau on one side of the debate and Hobbes on the other (120), these traditions seem to 
better capture how Rousseau understood his own position. As he remarked in the sixth of his Letters 
from the Mountain, quite possibly with the legislative-executive distinction in mind, ‘Locke in 
particular treated [these matters] exactly in the same principles that I did.’5 
There is a broader point here about precisely what Rousseau meant by claiming that the will 
of the sovereign pertains only to law. Tuck cautions against reading too much into this difference 
between Hobbes and Rousseau, instead arguing that it draws attention ‘to the fundamental character 
of popular sovereignty’ (134). For Tuck, the viability of democratic sovereignty in modern states 
relies on it being restricted to fundamental, or constitutional, laws. While this is certainly one aspect 
of what Rousseau understood by law, it does not exhaust the sovereign’s remit. Indeed, it is curious 
that Tuck neglects the one chapter of the Social Contract dedicated to the classification of laws, which 
indicates that civil and criminal laws also fall within Rousseau’s conception of law.6  
We need to know precisely what sovereignty involves before we can address the further 
problem of how frequently the sovereign people should assemble. Tuck claims that, for Rousseau, 
‘the democratic and sovereign legislator would meet only intermittently, just as Hobbes’s sleeping 
democratic sovereign would.’ (135) This comparison is overstated. As Tuck acknowledges, in 
Hobbes’s case the sovereign could be asleep for sixty or seventy years (91), whereas for Rousseau 
regular sovereign assemblies would be required to ensure that the government does not abuse its own 
power or usurp sovereign power, and these should increase in frequency the more power the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1990–2010), vol. 4, iii.1. Cf. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 
1988), ii.127–30. 
5  Rousseau, Letters Written from the Mountain, CW9, 236. For helpful discussion see Christopher Brooke, 
‘“Locke en particulier les a traitées exactement dans les mêmes principes que moi”: revisiting the relationship 
between Locke and Rousseau’, in Locke’s Political Liberty: Readings and Misreadings, edited by Christophe 
Miqueu and Mason Chamie (Oxford, 2009), 69–82. 
6  Rousseau, Social Contract, ii.12. Elsewhere, Rousseau also indicated that personal taxation and taxation on 
absolute necessities could only be established with the express consent of the sovereign body, Discourse on 
Political Economy, CW3, 163, 170. 
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government has.7 Later in the book, Tuck claims that democratic sovereignty could be preserved by 
the people assembling every forty-two years or so (265), but it is difficult to imagine Rousseau 
countenancing anything even approaching this. At question here is how long the sovereign can sleep 
without imperilling everything that is important about sovereignty. Hobbes and Rousseau offer very 
different answers to this question, largely because of their disagreements concerning what sovereignty 
entails and why it is important. Tuck’s answer is closer to Hobbes’s than it is to Rousseau’s. 
While Tuck glosses over some of the far-reaching implications of the differences between 
Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s views of sovereignty, he does emphasise what is arguably the most 
important point of disagreement between the two, albeit with a twist. The ‘key difference’ is that 
Rousseau ‘did not believe that the sovereign legislature could transfer or alienate its sovereignty to 
another person or assembly’ (139). On this point, however, Tuck argues that Rousseau simply 
removed an inconsistency in Hobbes’s theory, and it should not, therefore, be seen as ‘a theory that is 
in fundamental opposition to Hobbes.’ (141) Even if we grant Tuck the inconsistency he identifies in 
Hobbes’s theory, his conclusion does not follow. Hobbes might have been wrong to permit the people 
to transfer their sovereignty to a monarch, but Rousseau’s theory was still set out in stark opposition 
to the view that Hobbes endorsed (irrespective of whether he should have endorsed it). Indeed, in this 
respect Hobbes’s theory was little different to Grotius’s or Pufendorf’s. Rousseau thought that all their 
theories were deeply flawed precisely because they involved sovereignty being alienated from the 
people to either a monarch or an aristocratic assembly. This illustrates a more general problem with 
trying to fit Rousseau on one side of the Hobbes vs. Grotius and Pufendorf debate, which is that it 
precludes the possibility that what made his thought so original and provocative is that he aimed to cut 
through the debate and articulate a position that challenged both sides.8 
                                                          
7  Rousseau, Social Contract, iii.13.  
8  Tuck draws on Helena Rosenblatt’s important work on the Genevan context to highlight the contextual 
importance of Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s ideas, as mediated by Jean Barbeyrac and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui 
(121–22). But her account highlights that the Genevan patriciate used these theorists in a way that ‘drew them 
closer to Hobbes’ absolutist theory by emphasizing the contract of submission.’ See Helena Rosenblatt, 
Rousseau and Geneva: From the First Discourse to the Social Contract, 1749–1762 (Cambridge, 1997), 243; 
6 
 
 
* 
 
If these observations are broadly accurate then Rousseau might be better seen as marking a rupture in 
the tradition Tuck is tracing, rather than siding with Bodin and Hobbes against Grotius and Pufendorf. 
Moreover, if regular legislative assemblies are needed to vote on all matters of constitutional, civil 
and criminal law, then Rousseau’s account of what popular sovereignty requires is more demanding 
that Tuck suggests, in a way that provides an alternative vantage point looking forwards. Here it is 
worth emphasising that Tuck reads Rousseau as a thoroughly modern thinker, who thought that the 
sovereignty-government ‘distinction was absolutely essential if democratic politics were to be 
reintroduced to a world of large commercial states’ (4). Tuck’s evidence for this rests principally on a 
passage from the ninth Letter from the Mountain, where Rousseau wrote that ‘Ancient Peoples are no 
longer a model for modern ones’. Tuck quotes the passage twice (2–3; 141–42), and it does have a 
wonderful polemical bite that bears repeating: Genevans, Rousseau chides, ‘you are not even 
Athenians’!9 Nonetheless, the passage is somewhat anomalous and if Rousseau really did think that 
ancient peoples are no longer a model for modern ones then this raises more questions than it answers.  
In the Social Contract itself—tellingly, in a chapter entitled ‘How the Sovereign Authority is 
Maintained’—Rousseau  proposed to consider ‘what can be done on the basis of what has been done’, 
before turning to the Roman Republic for inspiration. 10  Indeed, Book IV largely comprises an 
extended analysis of Roman institutions. Given that the Social Contract was written with Geneva in 
mind, what are we to make of this if ancient peoples are really no longer a model for modern ones? 
Similar examples from elsewhere in his corpus abound,11 but Tuck does not address the (plentiful) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and, more generally, Robin Douglass, ‘Rousseau’s Critique of Representative Sovereignty: Principled or 
Pragmatic?’ American Journal of Political Science, 57 (2015), 737–39. 
9  Rousseau, Letters from the Mountain, 292. 
10  Rousseau, Social Contract, iii.12. 
11   Two particularly notable examples will hopefully suffice to illustrate my point. First, in the Letter to 
d’Alembert on the Theatre (CW10, 349), again with Geneva in mind, Rousseau lavished much praise on ‘Sparta, 
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evidence against reading Rousseau as someone who was trying to reintroduce democratic principles 
into a world of large commercial states, and it remains unclear how such passages could be reconciled 
with his interpretation. 
There is more at stake here than just a question of Rousseau interpretation. From Tuck’s 
perspective, Rousseau captures a distinctively modern way of thinking about sovereignty. But from 
another perspective, we could see Rousseau as articulating a vision of sovereignty too demanding for 
large commercial states, and the unfolding of Tuck’s subsequent history as illustrating the 
(insurmountable) problems of trying to make good on the sovereignty of the people in modern times. 
From this perspective, in so far as modern democracies are based on popular sovereignty, the 
developments in France and America represent, at best, a watered down version of Rousseau’s 
principles. To see why recall that, for Rousseau, regular sovereign assemblies must be established by 
constitutional law. Crucially, it is not enough for the people to have originally ratified the constitution 
if provisions are not in place for the sovereign to reassemble on a regular basis thereafter.12 If the 
people only assemble when called to do so by the government—as is the case in most modern 
referendums—then the people are not really sovereign at all. This is even true on Hobbes’s account of 
the sleeping sovereign.13  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which I shall have never cited enough as the example we ought to follow’. Second, the second chapter of the 
Considerations of the Government of Poland is entitled the ‘Spirit of Ancient Institutions’, the lessons from 
which Rousseau then seeks to apply to Poland, ‘the one of all the peoples of today which distances me the least 
from those about whom I have just been speaking’ (CW11, 174). 
12  Rousseau, Social Contract, iii.13. 
13  See the fourth case of electing a time-limited monarch in De Cive, translated as On the Citizen, edited by 
Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge, 1998), vii.16. Tuck claims that ‘the modern democratic 
sovereign is in effect in the third of Hobbes’s four cases’ (281). However, in Hobbes’s third case the people 
‘would hold meetings at fixed times and places’ while the government is still in power. Tuck acknowledges that 
‘the people under the American Constitution do not have a specific predetermined date for meeting but are free 
(in some sense) to meet whenever they choose’. I am not sure in precisely what sense Tuck thinks the people are 
free to meet whenever they choose. From Rousseau’s perspective, at least, for the people to act or take any 
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The sovereignty of the people, as Tuck sees it, is the promise at the heart of modern 
democracy, which is ours to revive if and when we choose to awake. But another way of seeing it—
arguably a more Rousseauean way—is that the reason why we are so thoroughly asleep is because 
this promise has little place in the large commercial states that most of us inhabit today. Indeed, this 
would not have surprised Rousseau, who thought that the prospects for legitimate states were 
vanishingly slight in eighteenth-century Europe and, in the Social Contract, concluded that it is no 
longer ‘possible for the Sovereign to preserve the exercise of its rights among us unless the City is 
very small.’14 Read this way, then, if Rousseau shows us what it would really mean for the people to 
be sovereign, Tuck’s history shows us why this ideal is now lost to us.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
decisions they must first be assembled and are, therefore, unable to choose to assemble in the sense Tuck 
suggests.  
14  Rousseau, Social Contract, iii.15. 
